We examine an economy whose consumers have different discount factors for utility, possibly not exponential. We characterize the properties of efficient allocations of resources and of the shadow prices that would decentralize such allocations. We show in particular that the representative agent has a decreasing discount rate when, as is usually posited, all of a group's members have a constant discount rate and decreasing absolute risk aversion preferences. We also identify conditions that lead the representative agent to have a rate of impatience that decreases with gross domestic product per capita.
I. Introduction
Time preferences determine individual saving and investment decisions, which are among the most important choices made by economic agents. Following Ramsey (1928) and Samuelson (1937) , such decisions are usually represented by assuming that consumers maximize the discounted value of their flow of utility, using a constant rate of impatience. We identify the conditions under which the preferences of the representative agent of a group of consumers also maximize discounted utility.
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We also link the rate of impatience of the representative agent to the distribution of impatience rates in the population. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002) survey several attempts to estimate individuals' discount rates. Rates differ dramatically across studies, and within studies across individuals. There is no convergence toward an agreed-on or unique rate of impatience. For example, Warner and Pleeter (2001) found that individual discount rates vary between 0 and 70 percent per year. As suggested, for example, by Rader (1981) , Jouini and Napp (2003) , and Lengwiler (2004) , there is no reason to believe that different consumers have identical time preferences for utility streams. This raises the question of the aggregation of heterogeneous time preferences. To examine this question, we consider a simple model in which each agent in a group maximizes a timeadditive lifetime utility. The discount rate is heterogeneous across the population, and it may depend on either the time of receipt (hyperbolic discounting) or current consumption. Agents may also have different instantaneous utility functions. We assume that the group is able to allocate consumption within the group in a Pareto-efficient way. That is, we posit an exchange economy in which there is a cake to be shared at each moment, what might be labeled the multiple-cakes problem. We first show that the behavior of the group toward time can be duplicated by a representative agent whose lifetime utility functional is also time-additive. Rubinstein (1974) also examined the question of aggregating heterogeneous rates of impatience, but he derives a solution only for a two-period model and for exponential and logarithmic utility functions.
One of our key findings is that if individuals have heterogeneous constant rates of impatience, the representative agent will not in general use a constant rate to discount the future, as Becker (1992) first observed. More precisely, if individuals have decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), as would seem reasonable, then the representative agent will have a declining discount rate. We call this declining discounting. In short, heterogeneous individual exponential discounting yields a collective discount rate that decreases with the time horizon. Under some realistic calibrations of the economy, the collective discount factor duplicates either the hyperbolic case discussed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) or its simplified beta-delta version (Laibson 1997) .
The cornerstone of our result is that individuals will appropriately change the share of resources each gets over time, so as to equalize individual intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. This allows us to define the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the representative agent, which will equal the interest rate in a market setting. Obviously, it is Pareto-efficient for the more impatient members to receive a larger share of the period's cake early in life, a share that will decrease with time. However, this desire for an unequal and varying distribution of the cake over time is limited by the limited agents' tolerance for consumption fluctuations. An individual's preference for smoothness is measured by the concavity of her utility function. As shown by Wilson (1968) and Constantinides (1982) , it is helpful to use the notion of (absolute) tolerance for consumption fluctuations over time. If denotes the utility function of an agent, her tolerance for flucu(7) tuations is measured by . This index vitally character-T(7) p Ϫu (7)/u (7) izes the allocation of the aggregate income when it varies over time. Pareto efficiency demands that more tolerant agents bear a larger share of fluctuations of the aggregate income.
Uncertainty plays no role in our analysis; variability in income does. Turning to pure time preferences, we show that the rate of impatience of the representative agent equals a weighted mean of individual rates of impatience. These weights are proportional to the individual tolerances for consumption fluctuations. This is intuitive. The group's rate of impatience determines the group's willingness to transfer aggregate consumption across time. Only those members who are impatient and have a large tolerance for consumption fluctuations want such transfers. An impatient agent with a zero tolerance for fluctuations favors a smooth consumption plan. As a result, when aggregating individual consumption plans, the representative agent will have a rate of impatience that is biased in favor of the rates of impatience of the more tolerant members. Except for exponential utility functions, the weights in computing the weighted mean of individual discount rates will evolve over time. Given this, we show how the collective discount rate relates to both the time horizon and the aggregate income in the economy.
II. The Model
We consider a cohort or a group of heterogeneous agents indexed by . Each member consumes a single commodity in continuous i p 1, … , I time from date 0 to date N. The natural commodity space is the space of functions that are bounded almost everywhere. Agent i's prefer-ϱ L ence order over alternative consumption plans is described by a smooth lifetime utility function defined on the commodity space.
is time-additive:
Following Koopmans (1960) , time additivity can be derived from the independence axiom stating that if two intertemporal prospects share a common outcome at a given date, then preference between them is determined solely by the remaining outcomes that differ.
where is the agent's consumption level at date t, and is l p (l , … , l ) 1 0 that it is the solution of the group's following maximization problem:
The reason why this variational problem expresses Pareto efficiency is well known. The locus of individuals' lifetime utilities obtained from feasible allocations is a convex set. It implies that, to every Pareto-efficient allocation, there exists a hyperplane characterized by 1 (l , …, that is tangent to this set. Because the set of feasible utility payoffs I l ) is closed under our assumptions, 2 a solution to program (1) exists. The term can be interpreted as the lifetime utility of the repre-V l sentative agent consuming the flow of aggregate wealth z. In the classic analysis of the static syndicate problem, Wilson (1968) and Constantinides (1982) considered a decision problem that bears parallels to (1). Wilson examined a decision under uncertainty for expected-utility maximizers with heterogeneous utility functions and heterogeneous beliefs. He examined a group whose members have differing utility functions and beliefs, which in turn provide the bases for their individual expected utilities. The group's goal is to choose one among a set of lotteries and then define a sharing rule for the monetary outcome so as to produce Pareto optimality. Using the additivity property of the expected utility model, Wilson proved that the optimal collective decision policy is isomorphic to the optimal decision policy of a representative agent who also maximizes the expected value of a concave function of consumption per capita in the cohort (see also Constantinides 1982) . The existence of a representative agent with such simple aggregative properties has become a cornerstone of theories in finance and macroeconomics. The following proposition presents an equivalent result in our model with time-additive preferences. Its simple proof by contradiction is left to the reader.
Proposition 1. Representative agent.-Suppose that the set of all feasible utility levels is closed and that the group allocates wealth efficiently over time according to the vector of positive 1 I l p (l , … , l ) Pareto weights. In association with this vector, there exists a representative agent with a time-additive lifetime utility functional
The associated efficient allocation is characterized by
It is noteworthy that the function v depends on the distribution of Pareto weights l. Proposition 1 enables us to decompose the multiperiod maximization program (1) into a sequence of static maximization programs (2). The time additivity of individual preference functionals is, of course, essential to get this result. Notice that the cake-sharing problem (2) has two parameters: the size of the cake z and the time t at which this cake is available. Its solution is therefore a function 1 N (c , … , c ) of (z, t). By proposition 1, the optimal solution of the 1 N (C , …, C ) intertemporal problem is such that for all t and i.
By the concavity of with respect to its first argument, the solution i u to program (2) is unique. Its first-order condition is written as
c for all (z, t) and i, where w is the Lagrange multiplier of the feasibility constraint associated with time t and average endowment z. By the en-velope theorem, the marginal value of wealth at time t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with time t. Thus we have that
z By writing , we have disentangled the two impacts i i C (t) p c (z(t), t) that time has on the efficient sharing of wealth. First, because time affects the marginal utility of every agent in the group, it is likely to affect the efficient sharing of wealth. Second, aggregate wealth changes over time, and individual consumption levels must reflect that. In the following proposition, we summarize the standard results describing the effect of a change in wealth at date t on the efficient allocation and on the marginal value of wealth at that date. Notice that
denotes the absolute tolerance for consumption fluctuations
Tolerance for consumption fluctuations.-The marginal propensity to consume out of aggregate wealth of an agent is proportional to this agent's tolerance for consumption fluctuations:
Moreover, the group's absolute tolerance for aggregate consumption fluctuations is the sum of its members' tolerances:
Proof. See, for example, Wilson (1968) . QED This proposition states in (5) that more tolerant agents have larger marginal propensities to consume. It is intuitively appealing that people who are more tolerant of consumption fluctuations should receive a larger share of aggregate fluctuations. All consumption levels are procyclical, but some are more procyclical than others. This result allows us to measure the group's tolerance for aggregate fluctuations, which is just the sum of the members' tolerances.
III. The Group's Rate of Impatience
In the classic case with homogeneous exponential discount factors, individuals' consumption levels vary only with fluctuations in the aggregate endowment . When discount rates are heterogeneous, by contrast, z(7) time enters as an additional factor. We examine the partial derivative of individual consumption levels with respect to time. When the average income z remains constant over time, it is intuitive that less patient people will trade later consumption for earlier consumption with those who are more patient. The impatient ones will have a decreasing consumption path, and vice versa.
The instantaneous rate of pure time preference of agent i consuming c at time t equals
It measures the rate at which marginal utility decreases with time when consumption is held constant. The classic discounted utility model assumes that d i is independent of (c, t). In the case of hyperbolic discounting, d is independent of c but decreases with t. Given that a nonconstant d raises a consistency problem, we assume that agents can commit to their future consumption plan at date . t p 0 Given the feasibility constraint, it must be that
When the aggregate wealth remains constant over time, increases in consumption by some members of the group must be compensated by equivalent reductions to others. Fully differentiating the first-order condition (3) yields
for all (z, t). Using (3) to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier , we can i l rewrite the above equality as
Replacing in (8) by its expression from (9) yields i c t
Proposition 3 characterizes the time profile of individual consumption plans when people have heterogeneous discount rates. It flows from properties (9) and (10).
Proposition 3. Individual consumption path.-The increase in consumption through time of an agent is decreasing in that agent's discount rate :
The individual consumption path proposition determines how more patient people should substitute current consumption for future consumption. Notice that the consumption path of agent i increases locally in t if and only if her rate of impatience is smaller than the weighted mean of individual rates of impatience, where is the effective pre- 
T (c, t) p T(c, t) (c, t). Suppose that there exist two agents i and j such that
i d (c, t) 1 for all (c, t). This implies that j d (c, t) i j i j c (z*, t) p c (z*, t) ⇒ c (z*, t) ≤ c (z*,
t). t t
We can now turn to the central aim of this paper, which is to characterize the aggregation of individual discount rates. Impatience flows from the fact that, seen from , the marginal value of an t p 0 increase in consumption decreases with the time at which it takes place. The impatience characterizing the group's preferences can be made more explicit by defining the group's instantaneous rate of impatience as
Combining conditions (13) and (10) yields the following result.
Proposition 4.
Collective impatience.-The instantaneous rate of pure preference for the present of the representative agent defined by (13) is a weighted mean of individual members' instantaneous rates:
Not surprisingly, the (implicit) psychological discount rate of the representative agent is a weighted mean of the individual rates of impatience in the cohort. The weights are proportional to the corresponding individual tolerances for consumption fluctuations. This weighting of the mean of is intuitive. When considering its attitude toward posti d poning aggregate incomes, the group must take into account the rate of impatience of those members who will have to postpone their consumption. As seen from equation (11), these will be the ones who have a larger tolerance for consumption fluctuations. This is why the collective rate of impatience is biased in favor of the rates of impatience of more tolerant members. To illustrate, consider a cohort with two agents. Agent h has a high discount rate and is somewhat tolerant of conh d sumption fluctuations. Agent l, by contrast, has a lower discount rate d l but has a zero tolerance for consumption fluctuations. Despite his patience, agent 2 will prefer to smooth his consumption completely. Therefore, agent 1 will bear the entire burden of aggregate fluctuations. The cohort's attitude toward time is therefore determined entirely by agent 1's preferences. In particular, the cohort's degree of impatience will be the larger d h .
IV. The Term Structure of the Group's Rate of Impatience
As a direct consequence of the fact that is a weighted mean, it is v d bounded below and above by the smallest and largest individual rates of impatience:
It is important to notice that the weights in equation (14) 
exp (Ϫd t)h (c)
h (c) The problem here is to determine whether the cohort as a whole should use exponential discounting when all its members use exponential discounting. When all members have the same discount rate, discounting at that rate is appropriate. With heterogeneous discount rates, fully differentiating condition
with respect to t and using condition (11) yields
where and are evaluated at .
Proposition 5. Hyperbolic collective impatience.-Suppose that every agent has a multiplicatively separable utility function with an exponential discount:
. The social rate of impatience
have an increasing (decreasing) tolerance for consumption fluctuations.
Proof. Consider a specific (z, t) and let and denote, respectively,
Under the condition that all have a constant sign, we have that is 
Moreover, we know from Jensen's inequality that
Obviously, combining (16) and (17) yields
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From equation (15), this is equivalent to
It implies that and have opposite signs. QED
To borrow standard terminology from the economics of uncertainty, increasing tolerance for fluctuations means that absolute risk aversion is decreasing (DARA), the traditional assumption. Notice that we do not assume any correlation between rates of impatience and degrees of tolerance for fluctuations. The monotonicity of these degrees of tolerance is the only thing that matters for the slope of the term structure of . Simple intuition supports this important result. From equation . We consider the case in which b tends c p a to infinity, which means that the left branch of the curve becomes vertical. Parameter a is the minimum level of subsistence. On the relevant domain [a, ϩϱ[ of this limit function, agents have a nondecreasing tolerance (DARA), with a zero tolerance at and an infinite tolc p a erance for all . We assume that the flow of aggregate incomes is c 1 a uniformly larger than 2a in order to guarantee a bounded value function. In this economy, any Pareto-efficient sharing of the cake produces a consumption pattern that flip-flops from subsistence to surplus, or vice versa. The patient agent enjoys the first path and the impatient agent the second. As a consequence, the social rate of impatience equals prior to and thereafter. The term structure is
simple downward step function in this case, a special case of hyperbolic discounting that is often referred to as the "beta-delta" model. Phelps and Pollak (1968) , then followed by Laibson (1997) and many others afterward, introduced this stepwise functional form to describe observed psychological discount rates.
This discounting functional would emerge as the socially efficient rule for less extreme examples. Let us replace the piecewise-linear felicity function by a power felicity function. The two agents have the same constant relative risk aversion g. Under the efficient allocation of re- e /m lation equals m. We consider the Pareto-efficient allocation that corresponds to the weighting function for some . In this
which is independent of z. When relative risk aversion g tends to infinity, tends to m uniformly for all t. When g tends to zero, tends figure 2 , we draw the discount rate as a function v d of time. As seen in (19), the collective discount rate declines with time t as . The discount factor can be written as
This is the functional form suggested by Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) , who generalized earlier proposals made by Herrnstein (1981) and Ma- zur (1987) . It is useful to examine how consumption is allocated in this economy. The set of first-order conditions (3) combined with the feasibility constraints can be solved analytically to yield
( )
where is the gamma function. In figure 3 , we draw
the efficient consumption plan for a few agents when the mean income in the population remains constant over time and is normalized to unity.
We see again what drives the declining term structure of the collective discount rate: At , individual consumption levels and individual t p 0 degrees of tolerance are positively related to the individual rates of impatience. This weighting leads to a social rate of impatience that is greater than m, the mean rate of impatience in the economy. As time goes forward, most resources go to those with low discount rates, and the social rate of impatience falls below m. Notice that, following condition (11), the consumption profile of agent d is locally increasing as long as d is less than . Because is decreasing in t, consumption v v d (z, t) d profiles of all agents with a rate of impatience d less than v d (z, percent are hump-shaped; by contrast, those agents with a rate 0) Ӎ 7.5 of impatience greater than 7.5 percent have decreasing consumption throughout. In general, efficient consumption profiles are either decreasing or hump-shaped under the assumptions of proposition 5.
In this section, we assumed throughout that all agents discount their group's rate of impatience may well depend on the group's wealth level. Despite this, the basic property of additivity of individual preferences is transmitted to the preferences of the representative agent. This implies that the representative agent of the group has no consumption habits and no anticipatory feelings if its members do not also have such psychological traits. The main objective of the paper was to identify the appropriate mechanism to aggregate heterogeneous time preferences. That mechanism has a collective rate of impatience at any moment that is a weighted mean of the members' local rates of impatience. Each member's weight is proportional to her degree of absolute tolerance for consumption fluctuations. This aggregation rule implies that the collective rate of impatience is decreasing with respect to the time horizon when wealthier consumers are less averse to consumption fluctuations, a common assumption. This reasoning presupposes, of course, that the group is able to redistribute consumption within the group in response to each agent's degree of impatience. For long horizons, any transfer of the group's wealth across time will mostly affect the more patient agents because they are the ones who have the largest stake on aggregate wealth. Thus, when considering investments affecting cash flows corresponding to these long horizons, the group should use the lower rate of impatience in the group for cost-benefit analysis. On the contrary, for short time horizons, transferring wealth across time affects mainly the consumption flow of the more impatient agents. In the collective cost-benefit analysis for such investments, the larger rate of impatience of these agents should be employed.
